South Africa's Path to Industrialisation, c1850-1925. by Ally, Russell
UNIVERSITY OF THE WTTWATERSRAND
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED SOCIAL RESEARCH
ADDITIONAL SEMINAR PAPER
TITLE: South Africa's Path to Industrialisation, cl850-1925.
Symposium hosted by the History Workshop and
Sociology of Work Unit. University of the
Witwatersrand - Work, Class and Culture.
BY: ALLY, R.
NO: A17
WORK, CLASS AND CULTURE
Symposium Hosted by the History Workshop and Sociology of Work
Unit.
June 28-30 1993
University of the Witwatersrand





South Africa's Path to Industrialisation, c.1850-1925
It is generally acknowledged that while there are some common
features underlying the process of industrialisation, each
industrial revolution has its own peculiar features. Moreover,
that the path followed by each country is determined to a very
large extent by its past.
But at the same time that industrialisation is a uniquely
national event, it is also a profoundly international phenomenon.
While shaped by specific historical and national conditions,
industrialism - since spreading from its original home in the
United Kingdom - has always taken place in an international
context. Anticipating this development given the international
character of the capitalist system of production - of which
industrialisation was an offspring - Marx more than a century ago
observed,
The country that is more developed industrially only
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own
future.
Explicitly, but more often implicitly, studies of South Africa's
industrialisation have therefore invariably tended to be
comparative. Liberals and revisionists alike have attempted to
categorise and understand South Africa's process of
industrialisation in terms of the nature of its relationship to
the world growth of industrialism. More generally, the attempt
has been to situate South Africa's industrialism in the broader
framework of the growth of capitalism and the international
division of labour.
Where the earlier liberal scholarship, however, was more
inclined to see South Africa's economic development in terms of
a stages of development paradigm - most commonly Rostow1s five
stages of economic growth - revisionists, on the other hand,
have been more concerned to discover what was distinctive about
South Africa's industrial revolution. Put differently, while
liberals have generally located South Africa's industrial
development in a kind of historical model which enabled present
events to be interpreted as a logical outcome of events of the
past, revisionists have largely been preoccupied with isolating
South Africa's particular pattern of industrialisation.
The concerns of this paper are largely the concerns which
K. Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, Volume
I, (London, 1983), p. 19.
L
 see especially D. Hobart Houghton, The South African
Economy, (Cape Town, 1969).
have engaged the revisionist scholarship. The paper attempts
thus to explore whether South Africa did follow a particular path
to industrialisation.
II
The revisionist historiography of the process of
industrialisation in South Africa has gone through a number of
stages. In the early scholarship, the country's industrialisation
was linked to the 'mining revolution* of the 1860s and 1880s.
Prior to the mineral discoveries, the country is regarded as
having been predominantly rural and agrarian. It was the
discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1868, and more
particularly, gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886, which is said
to have brought about South Africa's transition to an
industrially advanced and economically diversified society.
Indeed, in much of this early literature South Africa's
industrial revolution is synonymous with the mining capitalist
revolution. In a seminal article written more than two decades
ago, Stanley Trapido, drawing on Barrington Moore's work on
industrialisation in labour repressive economic systems,
suggested that Germany's industrialisation through the 'marriage
of iron and rye1 had its counterpart in South Africa in an
alliance between 'gold and maizef. Trapido at the same time,
however, was quite clear as to who was the dominant partner in
this uneasy union:
.... from 1890 to 1930, gold mining determined the
rate of growth of the South African economy and was
the major stimulant of manufacturing industries ..
For Trapido, it was the way in which the gold mining industry
developed which imparted to South Africa's industrialisation its
distinctive character. Most unique was the labour coercion
techniques employed - migrant labour and the compound system -
which led both to the perpetuation of social dislocation among
the African working population and the failure of the country to
incorporate the major part of its working class into its social
and political institutions.
This dual theme of extra-economic coercion and ultra-
Some of this revisionist work is cited below.
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exploitability of the black working class - which was regarded
as having its origins in the peculiar features of the mining
industry - was subsequently to feature prominently in much of the
early radical studies of South Africa's economic development. In
the work of Harold Wolpe, for example, South Africa's rapid
industrial growth was seen as the outcome of extreme coercion and
the homelands system, which made it possible for the employers
to pay wages below the cost of human reproduction. Capital
accumulation, for Wolpe, was linked directly to cheap black
labour.
Martin Legassick similarly identified the measures
elaborated to control and cheapen black labour as the unique
features of South Africa's industrial revolution:
Along with other mechanisms of labour coercion,
segregation created and perpetuated the system of
migrant labour which has characterised South Africa's
road to industrialisation.
Later revisionist scholarship did not abandon these themes of
labour coercion and cheap labour power. The emphasis, however,
was turned away from the working class to an examination of the
economic policies of the state. In the process, South Africa* s
industrial revolution became less identified with the mining
capitalist revolution of the late nineteenth century and more
with the political and economic developments of the interwar
years. The reasons for this change in focus were twofold. On the
one hand) the interwar years were increasingly recognised as the
period when an industrial policy was first elaborated and
implemented. On the other hand, and more fundamental, where the
earlier scholarship saw an almost natural evolutionary path from
mining to manufacturing, the new scholarship explicitly tied the
process of industrialisation in South Africa to the emergence and
growth of a national bourgeoisie.
Most influential in this regard was the work of Rob Davies,
Mike Morris, David Kaplan and Dan O'Meara. Adopting the approach
of Poulantzas, they argued that essential to understanding South
Africa1s economic development was distinguishing among the
various fractions of capital represented in the state and
identifying which fraction or fractions were hegemonic in which
period. In terms of their analysis, mining - which represented
imperial or monopoly capital - dominated the power bloc in the
first decade after the formation of Union in 1910, and it was
only after 1924, with the formation of the National-Labour Pact
government, that manufacturing - which represented national
1
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capital - was able to gain control of the state. Mining had
consistently opposed industrialisation - insisting that this
would raise the cost-structure of the industry - consequently,
it was only with the change in hegemony that a policy aimed at
the development of a viable secondary sector could be
implemented. The other strong theme in their work was the
association of secondary industrial growth with the civilised
labour policy of the Nationalist-Labour Pact government.
Manufacturing interests were provided protection from foreign
competition in exchange for providing employment for white
workers with the state itself consciously employing 'poor whites1
in the state industrial sector.
The revisionist scholarship on South Africa's industrial
development has moved on since the appearance of their work, with
much of their theoretical framework been jettisoned. But many
of the assumptions of Davies, et al have survived, albeit in a
different form.
Thus, in the recent work of William Martin, for example, he
too insists that there was no 'direct road' from mining to
manufacturing, and that a distinctive shift in state economic
policy was required before industrialisation could get underway.
Central to Martin's argument are the debates over trade and
tariff policies among South Africa's economic and political
leadership during the interwar years.
'Examining the debates of the day on their own terms',
he writes, ' ... reveals an extensive debate over the
proper path of economic growth: whether to continue
down the road of prosperous primary production or to
pursue an unchartered path towards advanced industrial
production by limiting free trade across the borders
of the Union'. U
By the mid-1920s, according to Martin, the free trade policies
which had characterised the economic policy of Smuts's
administration were decisively shattered by the Hertzog-led Pact
government 'making it possible to alter the country* s position
in the international division of labour through expanded
industrial production'.
More recently, the debate has shifted to a consideration of
the effectiveness of industrial policy during the interwar years
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and whether there was indeed a strategy to diversify out of the
extractive base provided by mining. For Ben Fine and Zavareh
Rustomjee, while there might have been the political will on the
part of Hertzog's government to promote industrial
diversification, the economic strength of the mining industry
militated against such a process occurring and set limits on the
kind of industrialisation which could and did take place. In
their view,
the interwar development of South African capital is
best seen as one in which the strength of mining
capital dictated the boundaries within which national
capital could be economically, and hence politically,
supported. There were then limits on the economic
policies of the state, whatever its derived political
objectives, because of its economic dependence on
mining capital.
Consequently, what characterised South Africa's industrialisation
was not a coherent and comprehensive policy, but rather ad hocism
and compromise. They do not deny that there were attempts to
promote industrialisation through tariffs, protection and the
establishment of state industries, but what stands out for them
is not these policies, ' as much as the failure to adopt an
additional range of industrial policies, promoting manufacture
through provision of skills technology, finance, intersectoral
linkages and marketing1.
What then are the dominant themes which emerge from the
revisionist literature of South Africa's path to
industrialisation? On the one side, there are those scholars who
see South Africa's industrialisation as having sprung from the
mining capitalist revolution of the late nineteenth century,
which gave to the process its distinctive and peculiar features.
On the other side, there are those who argue that the South
African experience was one of state-led industrialisation,
accompanied by protective tariffs, import-substitution, and the
creation of state corporations.
Certainly, the impact of the mining industry on South
Africa's economic transformation was profound. Mining stimulated
economic development in the form of investment, urbanisation,
infrastructure and skill development. More directly, the industry
was responsible for the growth of both the engineering and
chemical industries on the Rand. Also, it is possible to identify
a clearer commitment on the part of the South African government
to the country's industrial development during the interwar
period. But while both these approaches help us to understand
aspects of South Africa's industrialisation, each is too narrow
in focus to claim a particular pattern to South Africa's process
B. Fine and Z. Rustomjee, 'The Political Economy of South
Africa in the Interwar Period1, Social Dynamics^ Vol.18, No.2,
(December 1992), p. 28.
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of industrialisation.
A somewhat different approach is adopted by Belinda Bozzoli.
The origins, development and growth of secondary industry are
traced by her to a group of ideologists - connected to
manufacturing - who consciously fought for the interests of this
sector from the late nineteenth century. Beginning in the Cape,
this movement spread throughout the country, culminating in 1917
in the formation of the South African Federated Chamber of
Industries. The development proceeded through two stages. At
first, manufactures fought for protection against foreign
manufacturers. Once this had been accomplished, their emphasis
turned to the pivotal role of manufacturing in the creation of
a national economy. As Bozzoli explains the process,
on the one hand, there is the rise and eventual
victory of protectionism; and, on the other, there is
the transformation of South Africa from imperially-
dominated to locally-oriented capitalism.
By focusing on the role of ideology in the legitimation of
national capitalism, Bozzoli certainly shows the vision that
manufacturers had both of their own role in the economy and of
their relationship to other sectors of the economy, particularly
imperial capital. But again the analysis too readily ascripes a
distinctive character to South Africa1s industrial revolution.
Ill
Until the mining capitalist revolution of the late nineteenth
century, the path of South Africa's economic development appeared
to be from agriculture to manufacturing. In this regard, South
Africa would have been no different from Europe, where capital
accumulated from agriculture contributed to industrial
development, or America, where industrialisation in the early
stages was largely a rural phenomenon.
Much of this early industrialisation was centred in the Cape
and was based essentially on the processing of indigenous raw
materials. There was the odd cart and wagon making, boat building
and furniture making, but the major industrial activities were
wine and brandy distillation, food-processing, brewing, butter
and cheese making.
But if the appearance of the country's economic development
was from agriculture to manufacturing, the reality was something
different. Cape Town had grown up as a site of trade, commerce
and government. Moreover, the existence of a port meant that the
Cape could easily be penetrated by cheap manufactured imports.
From the outset then, limits were set not only on the growth of
industry, but also on the kinds of industries which could
develop.
B. Bozzoli, 'The Origins, Development and Ideology of
Local Manufacturing In South Africa*, Journal of Southern African
Studies, Vol.1, No.2, (1975), p. 214.
Given this situation, it is not surprising that one of the
first issues taken up by the early Cape manufactures was the
protection of their industries. During the depression in the
first half of the 1880s, they succeeded in getting the Cape
government to appoint a Select Committee to look into the
question of protection for colonial agriculture and industries.
Several witnesses to this 1883 Select Committee called for
various forms of government assistance to promote industrial
development. For example, a senior railway official recommended
the establishment of a scrap iron mill at the coal fields in the
Albert district, through which the Border railway passed.
In the end, the Select Committee did recommend tariff
reform, together with a system of bonuses, to encourage the
establishment of manufacturing in the colony. But very little
came of this. The main reason for the recommendations of the
Select Committee not being taken up was the opposition which came
from the merchants. Searle, president of the Cape Chamber of
Commerce, was opposed to protection generally, while Twentyman,
a Cape Town merchant, held that,
If commodities can be imported cheaper than they can
be made ,bere, I should say that they should be
imported.
This successful blocking of industrial protection by the
merchants not only revealed the extent to which commercial
capital dominated manufacturing capital, but - more importantly -
was also a reflection of the nature of the economy in the Cape
at the time. The Cape developed in the context of British
industrial and commercial supremacy. The result was its
integration into British-controlled markets and its subordination
to, and dependence on, British capital investment. This not only
secured the dominance of merchant capital, but also placed severe
constraints on industrial expansion.
Not satisfied with their ability to sell imported goods more
cheaply than locally produced goods, the merchants also acted in
other ways to hinder local manufacturing. The small trading
stores in the interior were effectively bonded to the big
merchant houses, on which they relied for credit and supplies.
As soon as there was any threat of these stores buying locally
produced goods instead of imports, the wholesaling houses
retaliated by cutting credit and supplies. As credit was hard to
come by and local industry only able to supply a limited amount
of goods, not many trading stores were willing to risk alienating
the wholesaling houses.
If in the Cape the government was unsympathetic to promoting
A. Mabin, 'Waiting for Something to Turn Up? The Cape
Colony in the Eighteen Eighties' , in A. Mabin (ed. ) , Organisation
and Economic Change, Southern African Studies, Volume 5,
(Johannesburg, 1989), pp. 32-3.
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local industrialisation, the same was not true of the Transvaal.
Kruger's government, both in response to the demands of the
farmers for a market for their surplus produce and in a bid to
achieve economic self-sufficiencyt encouraged the establishment
of new industries through a concessions policy. In terms of this
policy, businessmen were given the sole right to operate a
particular industry for a specified time, usually thirty years.
In 1881, the 'concession king', Hugo Nellmapius, undertook to
organise 'factories and furnaces for smelting and manufacturing
and treating all kinds of iron including cast iron, hammered
iron, iron for drawing wire, pig iron, wrought iron, sheet iron,
steel and iron wares'. But where the Cape manufacturers lacked
political support, the Transvaal - an agricultural backwater -
was unable to attract the capital required for such an ambitious
industrial programme. Before the emergence of the gold mining
industry, the only factories to develop extending beyond mere
handicrafts were built by Isaac Lewis and Samuel Marks for brandy
and whisky distillation and for the manufacture of glass, barrels
and jam.
In Natal, the development of manufacturing industry other
than sugar was less marked than in the Cape or the Transvaal.
Natal consistently followed a policy of levying lower duties on
imported goods than the Cape, which was aimed at promoting inland
trade with the two Republics and African territories. An increase
in the volume of trade meant more revenue from customs duties and
more employment in transport by rail and wagon. Trade -and
transport were therefore regarded as more important thaj* the
manufacturing industry, which consisted lhainly of sugar
refineries, flour mills, bakeries, saw Kills, wagon-making works
and tanneries.
The Orange Free State was of even less significance as an
industrial economy, where mainly handicrafts developed.
Even before the mining revolution, therefore, the prospects
of developing a manufacturing industry in South Africa did not
seem very promising. In the Cape commerce ruled, in the Transvaal
access to capital was restricted, in Natal trading was regarded
as a more secure source of revenue and the Orange Free State had
developed little beyond self-sufficient farming.
It was into this world that the large-scale primary industry
of the Witwatersrand intruded. Much more powerful, organised and
centralised than merchant capital, mining capital deepened and
18
Charles van Onselen points out that it was the capital
accumulated through liquor distillation which provided the basis
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extended the process of South Africa's subordination to
institutions funded largely by foreign capital. Where
manufacturing previously had mainly to contend with the hostility
of the big importers, the 'merchant princes1 of the south, they
now also faced opposition from mining and finance capital in the
north. Worse still, many of the merchant houses, hit by the
depression in the Cape and seeing great opportunities for profit
making in gold mining, invested large amounts of capital in the
Transvaal. 'In the longer term*, says Mabin, 'these forces of
geographical expansion involved the Cape inextricably in the new
industries of the South African Republic*. Not only did local
industrialisation therefore fail to develop, but where there were
opportunities for capital investment these went directly into
mining. The appearance of the mining industry on the economic
scene thus not only fundamentally altered South Africa's pattern
of economic development, but also the configuration of forces
ranged against manufacturing.
IV
The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 seemed to
bring new opportunities for manufacturing. Political union
brought into being a common market and internal free trade,
bringing to a close the customs and railway rivalry which had
characterised the preceding period. The manufacturers themselves
were also better organised. In 1904, a small group of Cape Town
factory owners came together to form the South African
Manufacturers' Association to 'guard the Colonial Manufactures'
interests.' The activities of the Association centred on
agitation for protective tariffs, the promotion of 'colonial
industries' and the local organisation of manufacturers.
SAMA had 50 members at its first general meeting in 1904;
70 in 1907 and in 1909 claimed a membership between 300 and 400.
In 1907 the profile of the Association was significantly enhanced
by the recruitment of W. J. Laite, who became its full time
organiser and most effective propagandist. Only a year after
joining the organisation, Laite set off on a tour of the
country's industrial centres 'preaching the gospel of
organisation and development'. Manufacturers' associations were
established in the Transvaal and Natal and in the Eastern
Cape. Regional rivalry held back amalgamation until 1917, but
national co-ordination of demands for protection was partly
achieved by the South African National Union, a pressure group
formed in 1907 by wealthy farmers who believed that there were
benefits for themselves in the protection of industry.
For SAMA, the establishment of union presented the country
19
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with two choices: either it could continue in the old way where
national prosperity was wrongly believed to lay in agriculture
and mining or it could embark on a programme of industrialisation
and take its rightful in the world1 s economy as a sovereign
nation. The choices distilled into either continuing with the
policies of free trade or introducing protectionism. As Chas H.
Lepper, a fanatical protectionist dramatically put it,
As in the affairs of men, so in those of nations, a
moment pregnant with potentiality arrives, which,
seized or missed by the nation's leaders, makes or
mars their country's destiny.
Such a moment has arrived now for South Africa. She
is at the parting of the ways. Her future is at stake,
and rests upon the decisions she will shortly have to
make, when the new Customs Tariff comes up for
consideration of the Parliament.
Manufacturers must have felt that the cause was vindicated when
in response to their demands, the new Union government agreed to
appoint a commission 'to inquire into the conditions of trade and
industries and other matters appertaining thereto *. Even more
encouraging was that the terms of reference also included 'steps
which should be taken to encourage (1 ) the trade and present
industries of the country; and ( 2) the establishment of new
industries'.
Chaired by Sir Thomas Cullinan, the first President of the
Transvaal Manufactures' Association, the Commission sketched a
picture of South Africa1s industrialisation which was firmly
rooted in the development and advancement of agriculture. In the
Commission's own words,
South Africa must begin at the beginning, and that is
develop her agricultural resources. It is often said
in regard to agricultural and manufacturing interests
that the one is the complement of the other, which is
true; but it is equally true that until the first
named is well established, the second cannot be
successfully undertaken, for industry has its
beginning in agriculture, and it must ever be so. It
can be traced through the industrial history of the
world; first agriculture, and then manufactures rising
from the cottage to the village industry and so on,
through successive stages to the modern factory
system.
22
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And in another part of the report,
The success of a country depends primarily on its
agricultural development; and until this is brought
about, industrial expansion will be retarded.
Ironically, a commission of enquiry ostensibly aimed at the
promotion of manufacturing, had more positive recommendations to
make with regard to agriculture than with regard to the
development of secondary industry. If the manufacturers, however,
had made a more sober and objective assessment of the political
dispensation after Union they would not have found this outcome
all that surprising. The dominant economic interest represented
in the national convention was farming. According to Thompson,
no less than 20 delegates were in one way or another linked to
farming. And if mining, banking and commerce were less well
represented, manufacturing did not even have one
representative. The slogans of the time were ' back to the
land' and 'Die Boer is die ruggraat van die land*. Botha himself,
the first Prime Minister of the Union, was a great advocate of
land settlement and agricultural rehabilitation.
In terms of the condition of agriculture in the country, the
emphasis of the Cullinan Commission was also not entirely
unexpected. In 1910 South Africa was still importing the bulk of
its agricultural products: corn and grain, flour and meal, fruit,
sugar, milk, meat and poultry. For the commissioners, only when
the bulk of these products were produced in the country 'can we
be said to be progressing*. Consequently, the Commission called
for the establishment of experimental farms, scientific methods
of farming and training and cattle breeding.
For ardent supporters of industrialisation through a policy
of protection, the recommendations of the Cullinan Commission
were a great disappointment. Rudely jolted out of its false sense
of achievement, the South African Manufactures' Association
decided to compile its own report on the needs of manufacturing.
Laite was commissioned to undertake this work, which involved
visits to Canada, the United States and Australia, both to learn
from the experience of these countries and to gain a comparative
perspective.
The major lesson which Laite claimed these countries taught
South Africa was that prosperity was intimately bound up with a
protective policy. ' [I]n each', he averred, 'the working classes
are far better off than in so-called Free Trade England1 .
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Laite took the hostility of mining and commerce to manufacturing
for granted.
'The crux of all opposition to the fostering and
encouragement of manufacturing interests ..'» he
asserted, 'centres in Johannesburg. The Chamber of
Mines has stated its case most explicitly, and it is
evident that the opinion holds that every interest in
the country must be sacrificed to the stated needs of
the mining community*.
More worrying to him was the position that the Cullinan
Commission appeared to be adopting, which counter-posed the
interests of manufacturing and agriculture. Drawing on the
example of the United States, Laite pointed out that America at
one time had also believed that its future lay in agriculture.
That the country should develop its farming activities, sell its
produce to the manufacturing countries and take in exchange the
manufactured products of these countries. Fortunately, however,
protection was adopted in the form of the McKinley Tariff of
1890, leading to the United States becoming one of the most
powerful manufacturing countries of the world. The experience of
the United States thus proved that
[ t]he interest of the farmer and the manufacturer are
identical, and the farmer who relies upon the practical
patriotism of the community to support him in his claim for
Protective duties, must be ready to give as well as take.
In a fundamental sense, the battle for a policy favouring
manufacturing in the immediate years after Union was a battle for
the soul of agriculture. The mining magnates and the merchants
most commonly presented their case against protection not in
their own interests, but by claiming that such a policy would be
deleterious to the farmer. If protective barriers were erected
around South Africa, the country's trading partners would
reciprocate, closing off important markets for agricultural
exports. Over and above this, agricultural machinery produced by
local manufacturing would be more expensive than foreign imports,
which would result not only in an increase in costs of inputs,
but also make South Africa*s agricultural produce uncompetitive
on the international markets.
The Union's first custom's tariff legislation - the Custom's
Tariff Act No. 26 of 1914 - thus reflected both the dominance of
mining and commerce and the ambiguous position of the new
government towards secondary industrialisation. Protection was
not wholly endorsed, neither was it rejected out of hand.
Existing industries considered beneficial to the economy
leather goods, building materials, timber, tobacco and
confectionary - were to be granted protection, while a more
29
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cautious approach was adopted towards new industries which still
had to proof their viability. Laite no doubt exaggerated for
polemical effect when he described the tariff legislation as 'a
display of ineptitude and callous indifference to the needs of
manufactures1. But the Custom's Tariff Act did favour free trade
more than it did protection, and its bias was more directed at
raising revenue than stimulating industrial development.
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 did for manufacturing
what both the manufacturers' associations and tariff reform had
failed to do. Where the manufactures' associations had relied on
ideology to convince detractors of the importance of the
manufacturing sector to the national economy, the need to replace
imports halted by the war was sufficient to win over most cynics.
And where tariff barriers were seen as artificial impediments to
free trade, the war's disruption of normal shipping patterns
brought a natural form of protection.
The main beneficiaries of South Africa's being cut off from
foreign suppliers were the garment industry on the Witwatersrand
and the boot and shoe industries in the Eastern Cape. Other
industries which also benefitted were leather goods, furniture
and dairy products. The growth of the manufacturing sector during
the war years was indeed impressive: from 1915/6 to 1917/8, 1700
new factories were opened, an increase of 45 percent, and the
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the national income
rose from 6.7 percent in 1912 to 9.8 percent in 1918.
These developments had a huge impact on both government and
manufacturers. In October 1916, the government appointed an
Industries Advisory Board, made up mostly of businessmen, to
advise it with regard to the industrial development of the Union.
As a result of a report of the Advisory Board in December 1916,
in which an auxiliary body for the solving of scientific and
technical industrial problems was recommended, a Scientific and
Technical Committee was also appointed. In October 1918 the
decision was taken to amalgamate these two organisations into the
Advisory Board of Industry and Science.
Finally able to overcome their regional differences, the
different manufacturers' organisations in the four provinces also
came together in 1917 to form the Federated Chamber of
Industries, * the body' , Bozzoli writes, 'whose future role as the
vehicle for the expression of industrial interests was to be
vital*. W.J. Laite was elected as the first secretary of the
new organisation.
The impact of the war on manufacturing, however, went beyond
questions of organisation. The involvement of manufacturing in
31
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the war effort inevitably led to a closer relationship developing
between industry and government, resulting in significant changes
taking place in thinking on industrial matters. Reflecting the
new direction in thought, B. Price, Chairman of the Scientific
and Technical Committee, in a memorandum on the future of
industrial development in South Africa drawn up as the war was
ending, ruminated
Anyone who has followed even superficially the recent
trend of thought in Britain and the various Dominions
must have been greatly impressed by the unanimity of
opinion in favour of combination, co-operation and
organisation in almost every branch of industrial and
commercial activity. It is now realised that the
successful competition of our enemies in industry and
commerce has not been due to any individual
superiority but to a more systematic and complete
national organisation.
It was not that the issues of tariff reform and protection now
became less important to manufacturing, but rather that attention
was increasingly given to matters of planning and organisation.
One of the first tasks suggested for the new Advisory Board of
Industry and Science, for example, was to 'survey the whole
position [with regard to industry] with a view to recommending
the nature and scope of national organisation for production and
trade best suited to South African conditions and formulating a
comprehensive programme for dealing with the various aspects of
the problem which call for attention1. Practically this
involved, inter alia., an extensive collection of statistics of
existing industries in the country and a detailed inventory of
the country's natural resources.
A further indication of the change in the direction of
thinking was the appointment by Smuts * s government of H.J. van
der Bijl to the office of Scientific and Technical Adviser.
Indeed, the government had brought van der Bijl back to South
Africa from the United States specifically to take charge of the
Industries Division of the Department of Mines and Industries.
A scientist by training, it was van der Bijl who came up with the
plan for the establishment of the Electricity Supply Commission
in 1922. A few years later the decision was also taken to
establish an iron and steel industry in South Africa, which van
der Bijl believed was the 'foundation* of all other industries.
In his first report to F.S. Mai an, Minister of the
Department of Mines and Industries, van der Bijl already gave a
clear indication of what he saw as the country's priorities:
If we aspire to anything approaching economic
independence, we cannot rely entirely on our
agricultural industries, but must pave the way for the
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development of manufacturing industries ...
Most of the Union's manufacturing industries are small
- many of them are very small - and still in a stage
where they need careful nursing to enable them to
survive the struggle that will result from the fact
that Europe is beginning to recover from the effects
of the war, and the conditions that enabled these
small industries to gain a temporary foothold, are
changing.
Van der Bi jl placed great emphasis on organised scientific
research, establishing a Scholarship Loan Scheme in 1922, mainly
to send promising candidates abroad to study the latest
developments in science and technology.
One of biggest problems which manufacturing had always faced
was securing access to capital. It was easy to approve of the
establishment of industries in principle, but not many were
prepared to put up the money required. It was against this
background that the turn to the commercial banks took place. In
1919, the National Industrial Corporation of South Africa was
founded, in which the National Bank took the lead. The paid up
capital was UK500,000, of which UK400,000 came from the National
Bank. According to the general manager of the bank, the company
was 'formed by us and some of our financial friends with a view
to establishing industrial enterprises.*
Unfortunately, the establishment of the National Industrial
Corporation coincided with the onset of a serious recession in
world trade. To make matters worse, its promoter and main backer,
the National Bank, itself underwent a serious crisis, eventually
floundering. Seven years after it was founded the National
Industrial Corporation was liquidated, having lost some
UK496,000.
Notwithstanding such setbacks, by the mid-l920s the profile
of manufacturing in South Africa had undergone a profound
transformation. Industries were increasingly becoming
electrically driven; experiments in the development of oil
products were proceeding apace; there had been advances in radio
communication, air-crafts, telecommunications and medical
science.
The role of the state had also changed. Whereas before it
had mostly left manufacturing to its own devices, it now co-
ordinated activities to accomplish certain set objectives. Old
views and attitudes of laissez faire based on individual self-
achievement gave way to views of social responsibility and social
advancement, albeit that it was white social responsibility and
white social advancement that was emphasised.
The example of Germany featured prominently in the change
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of attitude. The widespread belief was that the German state had
guided the development of Germany's industries in a conscious and
deliberate way. Government involvement in industry was therefore
not only considered to be justified, but regarded as a national
necessity. H. Warrington Smythe, Secretary for Mines and
Industries, defended this new position in a lecture to the
Department of Commerce of the University of Cape Town,
we went into the war in relation to our industrial
position like into a tunnel of darkness, into which we
went bound in the restraining bonds of orthodox
theories of government, of trade methods, and of
scientific development. We came out of it, into a new
world in which Governments had exercised unheard of
activities, commerce had entered a new era of
conflict, finance had gone mad in half the world, and
the scientific advance had been so immense in certain
directions that four years produced a revolution of
half a century.
VI
The coming to power of the Hertzog-led Pact government in 1924
is generally seen as representing a turning point in South
Africa's industrial policy. Taking the rhetoric of the Pact
government at face value easily gives this impression as well *
Soon after being appointed as the new Minister of Mines and
Industries, F.W. Beyers told the South African Federated Chamber
of Industries that it could expect a new and different industrial
policy from his government. The government would reconstitute the
Board of Trade and Industries as a permanent body with enhanced
powers. In addition, it would revise the existing tariff which
was 'unscientific and not based on rational principles, and
especially with a view to industrial development1.
The Pact government certainly delivered on most of its
promises, introducing the Tariff Reform Act of 1925 which
provided for a broad-based policy of tariff protection.
Consequently, Hertzog's government is often credited with
commencing South Africa's planned industrialisation through a
deliberate policy of protection. As Dan O'Meara has put it,
the Pact government pursued a bold and vigorous
programme of industrial and infrastructural
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development, agricultural subsidisation and the
protection of employment for white workers.
The Pact government's commitment to the development of secondary
industry in South Africa is not in dispute. In many ways it also
followed a bolder and more thought out policy than its
predecessor. The clothing industry, for one, was one of the first
successful areas of import substitution. After struggling for
twenty years against strong foreign competition, it was the
protective tariffs introduced by Hertzog's government which made
it possible for the local manufacturing of clothing to be
profitable.
Hertzog's government also used state industry, or state
capital as a catalyst of private industry, which became an
important lever in South Africa's industrial growth. The most
notable case was the creation of the country1 s first heavy
industry, the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa.
But in a more fundamental sense, the Pact government was
simply continuing the trends already evident during the last
years of Smuts's administration. Besides, both the international
and national environments were far more suitable for secondary
industrialisation. Britain emerged from the war with its position
as the world's leading industrial nation irrevocably shattered.
This opened up the space for local industry to develop in South
Africa. Also, many British manufacturing firms, fearing that they
would lose their market in South Africa, established subsidiary
companies in the country. Locally, mining and commerce - which
traditionally had been averse to secondary industrialisation -
began increasingly to diversify into manufacturing.
What conclusions then can be drawn from this overview of
South Africa's path to industrialisation during the period 1850-
1925? Clearly, to try and establish a set pattern of
industrialisation is a hopeless task. The process by which South
Africa was transformed from a predominantly rural and agrarian
community into an industrially advanced and economically
diversified society was sometimes planned, often reactive, and
contained many paradoxes. At the same time that industrialisation
represented a break with older forms of social, political and
economic organisation, it also grew out of these earlier forms
and represented an extension of what was present for many years.
While the process was intensely forward-looking, the path
followed was profoundly influenced by the country's past. At the
same time also that new classes and new social forces were
created, old classes and social forces either adapted to the new
conditions or were absorbed into the new society. Perhaps it is
apt to end with Paul Mantoux* s observation, which can be
interpreted as either a cop out or sensitivity to the complexity
D. O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, Class Capital and Ideology
in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948t
(Johannesburg, 1983), p. 33.
Nicol, 'History of the Garment and Tailoring Workers', p.
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and contingency which characterise processes of economic
transformation:
Economic movements are ... confused. Their progress is
like the slow growth of seeds scattered over a vast
area. Endless obscure facts, in themselves almost
insignificant, form great confused wholes and mutually
modify one another indefinitely. No one can hope to
grasp them all, and when we pick out a few for
description it is obvious that we must give up,
together with some of the truth, the rather vain
ambition of arriving at rigorous definitions and final
explanations.
P. Mantoux, The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth
Century, (London, 1961), p. 42.
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